DO NOT DELETE

4/21/2009 2:28:53 PM

RICCI v. DESTEFANO: “FANNING
THE FLAMES” OF REVERSE
DISCRIMINATION IN CIVIL
SERVICE SELECTION
LAUREN KLEIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution1 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 the United States has
made great strides in its journey towards widespread racial equality in
both the private and public sectors. Such success, however, has not
come without a cost. In an effort to maximize equality in the
workforce, employers have engaged in controversial hiring decisions,
to the dismay of countless applicants who believe that they have been
disadvantaged due to their non-minority classification.3
The City of New Haven, Connecticut, administered examinations
for the purpose of filling vacancies in the command ranks of its fire
4
department. Due to the racially unequal distribution of the test
5
results, the New Haven Civil Service Board (“the Board”) refused to
certify the results of the two promotional examinations in an alleged
5
effort to comply with state and federal anti-discrimination laws.
Frank Ricci, a white man, along with sixteen other white individuals

* 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws . . . .”).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976) (Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act prohibits discrimination by employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin).
3. See Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (allegedly favoring
minorities in employment decisions); see Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.
Conn. 2006) (same).
4. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
5
Id.
5. Id. at 150.
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and one Hispanic (Petitioners) who fared well on the examinations
but received no promotion, brought suit alleging that the city officials
charged with making the hiring decisions for the fire department
violated their civil (Title VII) and constitutional (Equal Protection
Clause) rights to be free from employment discrimination and to
enjoy the equal protection of the laws.6
On September 28, 2006, the District Court of Connecticut granted
Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on both the Title VII
and equal protection claims.7 The Second Circuit, by summary order
entered February 15, 2008, adopted and fully affirmed the district
court’s judgment. It later converted this summary order into a binding
precedential opinion before voting seven to six to deny rehearing en
8
banc. Due to a circuit split on the issue, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari9 on January 9, 2009, to determine whether,
under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, a state employer
may reject the results of a race-neutral civil-service selection
examination due to unintended racially-disproportionate test results.10
II. FACTS
In November and December 2003, the New Haven Fire
Department sought to fill Captain and Lieutenant vacancies by
administering written and oral examinations to its firefighters.11
Petitioners are seventeen white candidates and one Hispanic
12
candidate who expended significant sums of money, studied
intensely, and performed very well on the promotional exams but who
were denied promotion because, without the Board’s certification of
the test results, the promotional process could not move forward.13
Pursuant to New Haven’s Charter and Civil Service Regulations,
hiring and promotions must be based strictly on merit as determined

6. Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 1, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S. Aug. 21,
2008).
7. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
8. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–13, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8,
2008).
9. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci II), 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. granted, 129
S. Ct. 894 (mem.) (U.S. Jan. 9, 2009) (No. 08-328).
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008).
11. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008).
13. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp at 144, 146.
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by competitive examination.14 After each examination, the Civil
Service Board must certify a list of those eligible for promotion and
fill each employment vacancy according to the “Rule of Three,” which
mandates that a civil service position be filled from among the top
three scorers on the list.15 I/O Solutions (“IOS”), a seven-year-old
Illinois company that specializes in entry-level and promotional
examinations for public safety departments, designed the
examinations that the New Haven Fire Department utilized in 2003.16
Forty-one applicants took the exam to fill the Captain vacancies,
of which twenty-five were white, eight were black, and eight were
17
Hispanic. Based on the scores and pursuant to the “Rule of Three,”
no blacks and at most two Hispanics would be eligible for promotion
18
because the top nine scorers were seven whites and two Hispanics.
Seventy-seven applicants took the exam to fill the Lieutenant
vacancies, of which forty-three were white, nineteen were black, and
fifteen were Hispanic. Because all of the top scorers were white, no
blacks or Hispanics would have been eligible for promotion.19
Due to the correlation between test performance and race, which
reflected a disparate impact,the Civil Service Board held five hearings
to determine whether it should certify the results and promote the top
scorers in accordance with past practice or instead reject the results
20
due to their racial disproportion. During these hearings, the Board
heard from a variety of experts and state officials regarding the
fairness of the test and possible reasons for the disparate impact.21
Ultimately, the board split two to two on the question of certifying
each exam, which resulted in the promotional lists not being
certified.22
Ricci v. DeStefano arises from the decision not to certify the exams
and the allegedly discriminatory consequences of the Board’s

14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8,
2008).
15. Id. at 5.
16. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
17. Id.
18. Id. The City Charter mandates a “Rule of Three,” which requires all civil service
positions to be filled by an individual among the top three scores on such an exam. The top nine
scores included seven white applicants and two Hispanic applicants.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 145–46.
21. Id. at 145–50.
22. Id. at 150.
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decision.23 Petitioners allege that non-certification was due to political
pressure—an effort to garner the votes of minority constituents in
New Haven—and amounted to both Title VII and Equal Protection
violations; Respondents argue that the decision not to certify was
made wholly for the purposes of complying with federal, state, and
local anti-discrimination laws.24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court
delineated a three-part burden-shifting test to apply to Title VII cases
involving an allegation of intentional discrimination in an
employment termination.25 Under this framework, plaintiffs first must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination on account of race.26 To
do so, they must prove: (1) membership in a protected class; (2)
qualification for the position; (3) an adverse employment action; and
(4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the
basis of membership in the protected class.27 The burden of
production then shifts to the employer who must articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the rejection of the
employee.28 The employer’s burden is satisfied if the proffered
evidence, “‘taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was
29
a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.’” If the employer
puts forth such a neutral reason for the employee’s termination, the
burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer’s
alleged reason was in fact a pretext for discrimination.30

23. Id. at 144.
24. Id. at 150–51.
25. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Although McDonnell
Douglas involved an employment termination, its test still applies to non-promotion
employment cases as well.
26. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000).
27. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. (“The complainant in a Title VII trial must
carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s
qualifications.”).
28. Id.; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).
29. Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)).
30. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006).
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In Hayden v. County of Nassau, white and Hispanic applicants to
the police department, including both males and females, brought a
class action lawsuit against the county alleging that the police officers’
entrance examination, which was designed to minimize discriminatory
impact on minority candidates, actually discriminated against nonminority candidates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Title
VII, and the Civil Rights Act.31 The Second Circuit held that the raceconscious configuration of the exam did not violate any of these
provisions because the Nassau County Police Department was merely
complying with several consent decrees prohibiting it from engaging
in discriminatory practices or utilizing examinations that were unfair
to minority applicants.32 The county had conducted a validity analysis
to determine the configuration of the exam that both was sufficiently
job-related and minimized the adverse impact on minority
applicants.33 Plaintiffs asserted that the choice to reconfigure the
exam, in order to reduce the adverse impact on black candidates,
34
necessarily discriminated against non-minorities on the basis of race.
The Hayden court rejected plaintiffs’ contentions and stated that
plaintiffs were “mistaken in treating racial motive as a synonym for
constitutional violation” and that “[e]very antidiscrimination statute
aimed at racial discrimination, and every enforcement measure taken
35
under such a statute, reflect a concern with race.” This concern alone,
however, does not render these statutes automatically unlawful.36 The
court held that the construction of the Nassau County test to
minimize adverse impact on minorities was not intentional reverse
discrimination against whites because all applicants took the same
test and were thus treated uniformly on the basis of race.37 In response
to plaintiffs’ assertion that the design of the test illustrated
impermissible discriminatory intent, the Second Circuit stated that
nothing in the court’s jurisprudence disallowed the use of race-neutral
38
means to improve racial equality; rather, the court held that “the

31. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit
analyzes hiring and promotion decisions in a like manner.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 46–47. A validation study is the process that establishes, by statistical analysis,
that a particular test serves its intended purpose and measures the appropriate criteria.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id. at 49 (quoting Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1998)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 50.
38. Id. at 51.
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intent to remedy the disparate impact of the prior exams is not
equivalent to an intent to discriminate against non-minority
applicants.”39
In Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional
Services, the Second Circuit dealt with the issue of voluntary
compliance with regard to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.40 It stated
that voluntary compliance is, in fact, a “preferred means of achieving
41
Title VII’s goal of eliminating employment discrimination.” The
Second Circuit, in Kirkland, affirmed the district court’s decision to
approve a settlement that dealt with promotional order among the
ranks of the employees at the Department of Correctional Services
after minority employees had put forth a prima facie case of adverse
42
impact. This settlement would attempt to correct the discrimination
present in the examinations by determining promotion order on the
basis of both exam results and race-normed adjustments to the
exam.43 The court noted that requiring a full hearing before approving
the settlement would undermine Title VII’s preference for voluntary
compliance and was thus unwarranted.44 Accordingly, it determined
that voluntary compliance with Title VII actions are presumptively
valid and should be approved unless there is some showing of
provisions that are either unlawful or against public policy.45 Therefore
the court held that a statistical demonstration of disproportionate
racial impact regarding an employment decision constitutes “a
sufficiently serious claim of discrimination to serve as a predicate for
46
a voluntary compromise containing race-conscious remedies.”
The Second Circuit expanded Kirkland in Bushey v. New York
47
State Civil Service Commission. In Bushey, the Civil Service
administered a series of promotional examinations for supervisory
positions in the state’s correctional services departent; as in Kirkland,
the tests indicated a significant adverse impact on minorities, with
39. Id.
40. Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1121 (2d Cir. 1983).
41. Id. at 1128.
42. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 157 (D. Conn. 2006); Kirkland, 711
F.2d at 1130.
43. Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1133.
44. Id. at 1130.
45. Id. at 1128–29.
46. Id. at 1130.
47. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 157; Bushey v. N.Y. State Civil Serv. Comm’n (Bushey I), 733
F.2d 220, 227 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985) (allowing State to adopt a
remedial measure without direct pressure from minority applicants).
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non-minority applicants passing at almost twice the rate of minority
applicants.48 In order to rectify this situation, the Civil Service racenormed the scores for each group, which increased the pass rate of the
49
minority group to that of the non-minority group. Although the
plaintiffs argued that the state’s adjustment of minority candidates’
raw test scores discriminated against non-minority candidates in
violation of Title VII, the Second Circuit held that the disparate score
distribution between the two groups was sufficient to establish a
prima facie showing of an adverse impact on minority test-takers.50
Therefore, in accordance with Kirkland, there existed a sufficiently
serious claim of discrimination “to serve as a predicate for employerinitiated, voluntary race-conscious remedies.”51
Although the Ricci v. DeStefano court relied primarily on Second
Circuit decisions, other circuits have handled both Title VII and equal
protection claims differently by prohibiting most race-based
government decision-making that is not narrowly tailored to a
government purpose.52 In Williams v. Consolidated City of
Jacksonville, for example, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Equal
Protection Clause does not allow city officials to refuse to fill existing
employment vacancies based on the race of those in line for them—a
decision that squarely conflicts with Second Circuit decisions, which
allow for employers to adopt voluntary remedial measures to avoid
Title VII liability.53 In Dallas Firefighters Association v. City of Dallas,
the Fifth Circuit held that the promotion of women and minorities
over higher-ranked white males violated the Equal Protection Clause
due to the race-based and gender-based treatment afforded to each
group.54 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Biondo v. City of Chicago
held that neither Title VII nor the Equal Protection Clause allow a
city to respond to competitive examinations’ disparate impact on
minorities by denying or delaying promotions of white applicants or

48. Bushey I, 733 F.2d at 222.
49. Id. at 222–23.
50. Id. at 224–25.
51. Id. at 228.
52. See Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 157–60; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28–29, Ricci v.
DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008).
53. Williams v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003).
54. Dallas Fire Fighters Assoc. v. City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1038 (1999).
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by employing race-dependent eligibility lists.55 In essence, while the
Second Circuit focuses primarily on Title VII implications when
assessing civil service testing and hiring decisions, other circuits place
a stronger emphasis on race-based decision-making in conjunction
with the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause.56
IV. HOLDING
Because the Second Circuit summarily affirmed “for the reasons
stated in the thorough, thoughtful, and well-reasoned opinion of the
court below” and did so without engaging in its own discussion of the
57
relevant issues, this section focuses primarily on the district court’s
58
analysis of the issues presented in this case.
A. Title VII Claim
Because Petitioners alleged that Respondents’ decision not to
certify the examination results amounted to intentional
discrimination against the non-minority applicants, the court applied
the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green three-pronged burden-shifting
framework to the facts of the case.59 Under this framework, the court
found that Petitioners satisfied all four factors needed to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination60: they had shown membership in a
protected class, qualification for the positions in question, an adverse
employment action, and circumstances that gave rise to an inference
of discrimination on the basis of membership in the protected class.61
Although Respondents argued that Petitioners cannot establish an
inference of discrimination when all applicants are treated the same,
the court assumed arguendo that Respondents’ acknowledgement
that racial concerns motivated their denial of certification was
sufficient to satisfy the inference of discrimination necessary to
establish a prima facie case.62

55. Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152
(2005). An eligibility list is a list of applicants qualified for promotion based on examination
scores.
56. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008).
57. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci II), 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 894 (mem.) (U.S. Jan. 9, 2009) (No. 08-328).
58. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006).
59. Id. at 151.
60. Id. at 152.
61. Id. at 151–52.
62. Id. at 152.
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Once the prima facie case had been established, the burden
shifted to the Respondents to produce evidence that there was a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action taken against the
63
Petitioners. The court held that Respondents’ good faith attempt to
comply with Title VII was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
refusing to certify the exams and thus satisfied their burden of
64
production under the McDonnell Douglas test. To overcome this
presumption in favor of the Respondents, the Petitioners had to show
that the City of New Haven’s proffered explanation was pretextual
and thus merely an attempt to mask the underlying intent to
discriminate.65
The court ultimately held that Petitioners failed to show pretext
on the part of Respondents and thus did not satisfy their third burden
under the McDonnell Douglas test.66 Although Petitioners argued that
Respondents’ diversity rationale is prohibited as reverse
discrimination under Title VII, the court followed both Hayden v.
County of Nassau and Kirkland v. New York State Department of
Correctional Services in finding that this statute actually allows for the
use of race-neutral means to increase minority and female
representation in the workforce.67 An intent to remedy a disparate
impact is not, therefore, equivalent to an intent to discriminate against
68
non-minority applicants.
The court further held that the Respondents’ remedy was
decidedly less race-conscious than the remedies in Kirkland and
Bushey v. New York State Civil Services Commission—both of which
69
the Second Circuit had approved. New Haven did not race-norm the
scores but rather decided to start over with a new test entirely so as to
70
remedy the disparate impact of the last examinations. Thus, while the
Board took race into account when making its decision not to certify
the results, the outcome was race-neutral due to the fact that all test
results were discarded and all applicants would have to participate in

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (finding
employer’s proferred evidence unworthy of credence).
66. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
67. Id. at 157–58.
68. Id. at 157; Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 1999).
69. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
70. Id.
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another selection process.71 Consequently, the court held that
Petitioners do not have a viable claim of reverse disparate impact or
discrimination. Utilizing the reasoning of Hayden, the court found no
evidence of discriminatory animus towards Petitioners; rather, it
found that the Board, the City of New Haven, and the other
Respondents were merely trying to eliminate employment
discrimination by voluntarily complying with Title VII regulations.72
The court held that Respondents’ motivation to deny promotions due
to a test with a racially disparate impact does not constitute
discriminatory intent; as such, there is insufficient evidence for
Petitioners to prevail on their Title VII claim.73
B. Equal Protection Claim
Petitioners argued that Respondents violated the Equal
Protection Clause either by employing a race-based classification
system for promotion or by applying facially neutral promotion
criteria in a racially discriminatory manner.74 In accordance with
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, the court acknowledged that nonminorities have been found to be a protected group for purposes of
equal protection claims.75 But in response to Petitioners’ claims, the
court held that Respondents did not employ any racial classifications
because every applicant was treated in the same way when the Board
denied certification of the test results.76 In accordance with the
Hayden decision, the court stated that there is no racial classification
when an examination is “administered and scored in an identical
fashion for all applicants” or when an entrance exam is designed to
diminish an adverse impact on minority applicants.77 Likewise, the
court rejected the Petitioners’ claim that the exam was a facially
neutral test used in a discriminatory manner for the same reason the
Hayden court denied a finding of racial classification—“equal”
treatment of all applicants.78 The Court rested this premise on the fact

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
160.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.; see also Hayden, 180 F.3d at 51.
Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
Id.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210 (1995); Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at
Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161; Hayden, 180 F.3d at 48.
Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161 (quoting Hayden, 180 F.3d at 48).
Id.; see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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that all applicants took the same test and were scored in an identical
fashion.
Although Petitioners continued to assert discriminatory intent on
the part of Respondents, the court held that Respondents acted to
further their goal of diversity in the fire department, to remedy the
exam’s disparate impact on minorities, and to prevent the City from
79
being sued under Title VII by unsuccessful minority applicants. As a
80
result, the court denied the Petitioners’ equal protection claim.
V. ANALYSIS
The Ricci v. DeStefano holding is problematic from both a legal
and political standpoint. As stated in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect and . . . call for the most exacting judicial examination.”81 In
Ricci, the court acknowledged that Respondents denied promotion to
non-minority applicants because they were concerned about the racial
disparities in the test results and that, but for this disparate impact,
82
Petitioners would have been promoted. Despite this seemingly clearcut case of race-based decision-making, the court failed to apply strict
scrutiny, setting itself apart from other circuit courts.83 Instead, it
stated that because nobody was promoted and that the result was the
same for all, no racial classification occurred and a lower level of
scrutiny was appropriate.84
The results, however, were not the same for all; those who earn
low scores should have no right to be promoted, whereas those who
earn high scores should be eligible to be promoted. Treating
Petitioners, who were among the top scorers on the exam, and other
applicants equally—by denying them all a promotion—is an unfair
manipulation of equal protection law.
Another error in the court’s judgment is the incongruity in its
reasoning: for Title VII purposes, the court assumed Petitioners had

79. Id. at 162.
80. Id.
81. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)).
82. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
83. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008);
Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152 (2005)
(awarding damages to white applicants for unfair treatment).
84. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161.
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suffered a race-based adverse employment action, yet it also held that
no racial classification had occurred for equal protection purposes.85 If
the court found a racial classification, Respondents would need to
assert a compelling state interest for their actions and prove that they
were narrowly-tailored to meet this goal.86 Instead, the court, failing to
apply strict scrutiny, allowed Respondents to satisfy their burden of
proof by simply asserting a “good faith belief” that a disparate impact
existed among the test scores and that this alone justified the decision
not to certify the exams.87 Such lax equal protection jurisprudence is a
risky precedent for the court to set.
While the Second Circuit concluded that Respondents’ allegedly
race-based decisions were justified due to their desire to fulfill their
obligations under Title VII, the Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected
this reasoning in Biondo v. City of Chicago:
Still, the premise of the City’s argument is that regulations supply a
compelling governmental interest in making decisions based on
race. How can that be? Then Congress or any federal agency could
direct employers to adopt racial quotas, and the direction would be
self-justifying: the need to comply with the law (or regulation)
would be the compelling interest. Such a circular process would
88
drain the equal protection clause of meaning.

In accordance with established rules of statutory construction, a
statute must be read with the presumption that Congress did not
intend to authorize conduct strictly prohibited by the Constitution.89
To allow such behavior would upset the balance of power integral to
the functioning of the United States government and render the
Equal Protection Clause powerless in its wake.
The Ricci courts’ assertion that requiring a judicial determination
of discrimination against minorities in disparate impact cases would
undermine Title VII’s policy favoring voluntary compliance is
relatively unpersuasive.90 The Supreme Court has held in previous
cases that affirmative action plans must be strictly monitored “to
85. Id. at 152, 161.
86. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2770 (2006)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
88. Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1152
(2005).
89. Bushey v. N.Y. State Civil Serv. Comm’n (Bushey II), 469 U.S. 1117 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
90. See Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 157.
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prevent the practice of discrimination for discrimination’s sake.”91 In
an effort to avoid Title VII lawsuits from minority applicants, New
Haven and related Respondents denied all promotions without
conducting a validity study of the exams or searching for alternative
tests with less adverse impact, as other circuits have required, and yet
were somehow still successful in both the district court and the circuit
court.92
A valid, though unsuccessful, argument put forth by Petitioners
was that Respondents masked their attempt to achieve political
favoritism among minority voters as an effort to comply with Title VII
93
and related anti-discrimination laws. Although the court may have
been hesitant to accept the legitimacy of this contention, Petitioners
proffered evidence illustrating a pattern of political manipulation by
the City of New Haven in its promotional decisions in both the police
and fire departments.94 Such a political motive would seemingly be
sufficient to establish pretext behind Respondents’ actions, but the
court held, as had the Tenth Circuit in EEOC v. Flasher Co., Inc., that
pretext is not shown even if an unseemly reason, such as political
95
favoritism, actually accounts for the decision. This standard seems to
have far-reaching political implications. If the Supreme Court fails to
uphold strict scrutiny in Ricci, the very sort of “race politics” that
allegedly occurred in New Haven might “lurk behind any racial
classification not held to the exacting strictures of the [Equal
Protection] Clause.”96 Elected officials would thus be able to achieve
political goals and gain the support of minority voters while actually
engaging in intentional discrimination against non-minority
constituents.
Although achieving racial diversity in the New Haven Fire
Department is an admirable goal, an attempt to do so at the expense
of well-qualified firemen who worked hard to pass a race-neutral and
presumptively valid civil service examination deserves stricter judicial
scrutiny. The Second Circuit adhered to its own jurisprudence in

91. Bushey II, 469 U.S. at 806–07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 160; see EEOC v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) (pretext
is not shown merely because “some less seemly reason—personal or political favoritism, a
grudge, random conduct an error in the administration of neutral rules—actually accounts for
the decision”).
96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008).
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formulating its opinion, but one has to wonder how long the court’s
loose scrutiny of seemingly race-based decision-making will fan the
flames of reverse racial discrimination or if the Supreme Court will
use Ricci in order to halt this approach.
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of Petitioners’ Argument
Although Petitioners made several allegations regarding the
unlawfulness of the City’s actions, they would have been more likely
to prevail if they had put forth a mixed-motive, rather than an
intentional, discrimination claim. With intentional discrimination
comes a heightened burden of proof, whereas a mixed-motive claim is
subject to the less stringent framework of Price Waterhouse v.
97
Hopkins. If Petitioners alleged that Respondents made decisions
based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations, Price
Waterhouse establishes that Respondents would pass constitutional
muster only if they could prove that they would have made the same
98
decision regardless of the discriminating/illegitimate factor. Here,
Respondents’ decision to decline certification of the exam results was
motivated, at least in part, by the race of those who scored well on the
exam; thus, it would be difficult for Respondents to escape liability
under this framework.99 Though Petitioners asserted political
influence and fear of public criticism as reasons behind Respondents’
actions, doing so under the mixed-motive framework would have
resulted in a better chance of prevailing in both the lower courts and
the Supreme Court.
Although rejected by the courts below, Petitioners argued that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Uniform Guidelines
for Employee Selection Procedures (“the Guidelines”) mandate that
Respondents conduct a validation study before deciding not to certify
the examinations.100 This argument is reasonable, given the fact that
defendants merely relied on a “good faith belief” that disparate
101
impact alone would justify their decision to decline certification. As
97.
98.
2008).
99.
100.
101.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 244–45; Brief of Respondents, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Nov. 13,
See Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci I), 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 151.
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the Guidelines state, “the greater the severity of the adverse impact
on a group, the greater the need to investigate the possible existence
of unfairness.”102 The scenario in Ricci v. DeStefano presents the
situation opposite to typical discrimination cases, but Respondents
should still have a duty to look into the validity of the exams before
rejecting them without further investigation. The examinations may in
fact have been unfair, but the Guidelines imply that a validation study
would be necessary in order to uphold such a defense.103 As
Petitioners rightfully concede, Title VII provides that professionallydeveloped and properly-validated tests are a defense to a claim of
disparate impact.104 Thus, Respondents’ fear of potential Title VII
liability with regard to minority applicants would be unwarranted if
the promotion exam was proved valid. If the Supreme Court adopts
Petitioners’ arguments on this issue, the Petitioners have a greater
chance of prevailing on their discrimination claim.
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Respondents’ Argument
The strength of Respondents’ case stems from the overarching
policy rationale behind their actions—achieving racial diversity in the
fire department. Respondents, however, put forth a weak attempt to
justify the actions they took in purported compliance with Title VII.
The Board argues that it rejected the test results based in large part
on
the
testimony
of
Dr.
Christopher
Hornick,
an
industrial/organizational psychologist who runs a consulting business
in competition with IOS who testified at the Civil Service Board
105
hearings. Dr. Hornick testified that the results of the promotional
tests had a “relatively high adverse impact” and that the test his
company designs would not produce such an unfair result.106 Although
testimony from other experts in the field provided contrary feedback,
the Board decided that Dr. Hornick’s testimony provided it the basis
for a good faith belief that certifying the results would put the Board
107
in violation of Title VII and state anti-discrimination laws. A good
faith belief, rather than an informed belief, in the legitimacy of their
actions is a weak argument to present to the Supreme Court.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 154; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
Id.
Id.
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Although the adequacy of Respondents’ justification for their
actions is questionable, they do have statistics on their side.
Specifically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(“EEOC’s”) “four-fifths rule” states that a selection tool that yields a
selection rate for any racial group that is less than four-fifths of the
rate for the group with the highest rate is generally regarded by
federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.108 Here,
black applicants had a pass rate of about one-half that of the white
applicants—well below the four-fifths required to satisfy EEOC
109
standards. Because this low pass rate was not appreciably different
from the rate in years past, when Respondents took no action,
Petitioners may still be able to establish the required pretext on
110
behalf of Respondents. Respondents’ assertion that their actions
were merely a response to the disparate pass rate on the exam is
suspect and should be examined further by the Supreme Court.
C. Likely Disposition of the Supreme Court
Given its prior holdings in equal protection cases, the Supreme
Court will likely reverse the judgment of the Second Circuit and find
111
in favor of Petitioners. The Court has held that “[r]ace-based
government decision making is categorically prohibited unless
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”112 Thus, unlike the
Second Circuit, the Court will likely apply strict scrutiny to
Respondents’ actions. Although it has held diversity to be a
compelling interest in higher education due to the educational
benefits of having a “critical mass” of diverse students, it is unlikely
that the same diversity rationale will be accepted in the civil service
arena.113
As the Court held in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., one of
the purposes of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” attempts by city

108. Id. at 153.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 154.
111. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (subjecting race-based
decision-making to strict scrutiny); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(barring quota systems in college admissions due to unconstitutionality with regard to nonminority applicants); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2006) (failing to find compelling interest in outright racial balancing).
112. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2770.
113. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)(finding that law schools have a compelling
interest in obtaining a diverse student body).
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officials to practice racially-motivated politics under the guise of
remedial action.114 If the Court finds that Respondents’ actions were
the result of undue political influence, it would be hard-pressed to
allow this justification to pass strict scrutiny. The Court has deemed
“outright racial balancing” to be unconstitutional and may very well
characterize New Haven’s actions as such.115 Unless the Court
significantly deviates from its precedent, the Respondents’ arguments
are unlikely to prevail under a more exacting standard of review.

114. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488 (1989).
115. Id. at 507; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757.

